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Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of Overbooking in the Airline Industry
The airline industry, like many industries, is extensively regulated
by a federal agency and a corpus of federal law and is also subject to
numerous state laws and regulations. When conflict between the two
is clear, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
ensures that the federal law or regulatory agency action, if valid, will
preempt any inconsistent state law. When conflict is less clear, as
where the federal and state laws are arguably consistent or where
federal intent to preempt is manifested by mere congressional or
agency inaction, the preemption issue thus raised becomes considerably more complex.
Such complexity is common in the airline context, both because
the Federal Aviation Act1 (FAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) do not purport to regulate all aspects of the industry and
because airline activities are so varied that they come within the reach
of numerous state statutory and common-law rules. This Note will
consider the power of the CAB to preempt state law and thereby to
insulate airline activities from state-law liability. It will suggest a
framework for analyzing the problems of preemption by focusing on
airline concealment of overbooking practices. Section I explains
airline overbooking and demonstrates that concealment of overbooking will often constitute common-law misrepresentation as that tort is
usually defined. Section II, taking into account the most recent
elaboration by the Supreme Court in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc. 2 , examines the CAB's general power under the Federal Aviation
Act and establishes the tests used by the courts to determine whether
state law is incompatible with the Act. It then considers what the
CAB must do to make clear a specific intent to preempt state law.
Section ill applies the analysis of section II to determine whether the
CAB can insulate airlines from misrepresentation liability for concealment of overbooking practices and seeks to ascertain whether the
CAB has actually attempted to preempt state law in this area.
1. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
2. 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (U.S. June 7, 1976) (No. 75-455). In Nader, the Court
decided only that the CAB did not have "primary jurisdiction" over the issues raised
by concealment of overbooking. Still, the decision, particularly its construction of
various statutes dealing with the powers of the CAB, is pertinent to the subject matter
of this Note.
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I. OVERBOOKING AND MISREPRESENTATION
Overbooking, a practice common to all airlines, 3 occurs when an
airline accepts more reservations for a particular flight then there are
seats on the airplane. Deliberate overbooking is a response to the
problem of "no-shows,"4 persons who reserve airline space but neither use nor cancel their reservations. Past efforts to deal with this
problem have included ticketing time limits, reconfirmation requirements, 5 and the imposition of reservation service charges. These
programs succeeded in reducing the number of no-shows, but customer ill wil1 6 caused them to be abandoned in favor of the current,
flexible system that allows airline customers to make reservations
freely and to recover the full value of their fares if they do not use
their reservations.
Studying a flight's no-show history allows air carriers to predict
future reservation turnover and no-show incidence and to employ
controlled overbooking as a means of reducing the chance that a fully
booked airplane will depart with empty seats. Thus, overbooking
enables the airlines to utilize effectively the flexible reservation system, 7 permits passengers who would not otherwise be accommodated
on the flight of their choice to make confirmed reservations, and helps
carriers to increase their load factor. 8
However, deliberate overbooking inevitably results in instances
in which more persons holding confirmed reservations appear for a
flight than are predicted so that some must be denied boarding.
Denial of boarding to individuals with confirmed reservations in such
an "oversale" situation, commonly called "bumping," appears at first
glance to be a statistically insignificant problem. There were 5 .4
oversales per 10,000 enplanements in 1972 and 4.6 in 1973.9 In
3. Initial Decision, CAB Docket 26253, Emergency Reservation Practices Investigation, at 10 (June 10, 1974) [hereinafter CAB Initial Decision].
4. See Note, Court Usurpation of CAB Function: The Problem of the "Bumped"
Passenger, 43 UMKC L. REV. 112 (1974). See also CAB Initial Decision, supra
note 3, at 2. In December 1972, the industry total of no-shows per flight in a
sample survey was 21.2 per cent. In December 1973, the figure reached 24.7 per cent
The low for the year 1973 was 12 per cent in July. Id. appendix B, at 1.
5. CAB Initial Decision, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Id. at 2-3.
7. Id. at 8-9: ''The successful growth and development of air transportation has
been aided significantly by the flexibility of the industry's reservation practices and
procedures which make airline services easily available to the public. The airline
passenger has substantial freedom of choice to make reservations at carriers' offices or
through agents and to cancel them by telephone or in person. Also, should a ticketed
passenger have a change of plans, he is free in most situations to use his ticket on
flights of other air carriers without endorsement."
8. See Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs, and Reports of
Unaccommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CAB Docket 16563,
32 Fed. Reg. 459, 460 (CAB Order EDR-109 (1967)) [hereinafter Proposed Priority
Rules].
9. Brief for CAB as Amicus Curiae, appendix B, at 50, Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae].
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absolute terms, however, the numbers are quite substantial-nearly
83,000 persons were bumped in 1972 and approximately 76,000 in
1973.10 In recognition of the inconvenience and hardship that can
occur when persons who expect to board a flight are not allowed to
do so, the CAB adopted rules that provide for compensation payments to individuals who are bumped.11 If accepted, this compensation constitutes liquidated damages for all injuries suffered by the
passenger.1 z
The CAB and the airline industry contend that overbooking is
essential if the public is to enjoy flexibility in reservation practices. 111
Justification of controlled overbooking on such policy grounds, however, still leaves open the question whether airlines can legitimately
continue to conceal overbooking practices from the public. Currently, the printed statements disseminated (according to CAB regulations) to persons who have been bumped14 contain no mention of
overbooking as a possible cause of the ticket oversale. The airlines
themselves are more active in concealing the reasons why customers
with reservations must occasionally be bumped. Thus, Eastern Airlines' company manual instructs its employees never to use the word
"oversale" in a conversation within hearing distance of anyone other
than Eastern employees. 15 Similarly, the American Airlines manual
states that "[i]f a passenger asks reason for oversale, tell him that the
reason will be known only after an investigation has been conducted
and all the facts are revealed."16
The facts of a case just decided by the Supreme Court, Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 11 illustrate the plight of the bumped passenger and provide a convenient framework for discussing the misrepresentation issues raised by airline concealment of overbooking. In
April 1972, Ralph Nader agreed to make several appearances on
behalf of the Connecticut Citizen Action Group (CCAG), a public
interest corporation. His principal appearances, designed to attract
contributions and other support for the CCAG, were scheduled for
April 28, 1972, beginning at noontime in downtown Hartford. On
April 25, Nader reserved a seat for April 28 on an Allegheny Airlines
10. Id.
11. 14 C.F.R. § 250.5 (1975) (Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation
Tariffs, and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers).
12. 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1975).
13. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8, at 460-61.
14. See 14 C.F.R. § 250.9 (1975).
15. Brief for Appellee at 30 n.13, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
16. Id.
17. 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), revd. and remanded, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), revd. and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (U.S. June 7, 1976) (No.
75-455).
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flight from Washington to Hartford, and on April 28 he purchased his
ticket from a travel agency and proceeded to the Washington Airport.
Upon his arrival approximately five minutes before the flight's scheduled departure, Nader was informed by an Allegheny agent that it was
full and that he could not be accommodated. As a result, Nader was
unable to appear at the Hartford rally. At no time before the flight
was he aware of the fact that Allegheny had intentionally overbooked
his flight. Pursuant to CAB policy, Allegheny offered Nader deniedboarding compensation, but he rejected the offer as inadequate and,
instead, filed suit against the airline in federal district court alleging,
inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation. 18
To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in most
states, an individual must show (a) a false representation (b) in
reference to a material fact (c) made with knowledge of its falsity
(d) and with an intent to deceive (e) with action taken in reliance
upon the representation. 19 Although the factual circumstances in
18. The district court entered a judgment for Nader, awarding him a total of ten
dollars in compensatory and 25,000 dollars in punitive damages. 44 U.S.L.W. at
4805. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, in what
it considered an "application of the principles of primary jurisdiction, a doctrine
whose purpose is the coordination of the workings of agency and court." 512 F.2d
at 544. The court of appeals based its decision on a construction of section 411 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), which reads:
The Board may . . . investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof.
If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or
unfair methods of competition, it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier,
or ticket agent to cease and desist . . . .
The court construed this section to mean that, if the Board "properly finds that a
practice is not deceptive, a common law action for misrepresentation must fail as a
matter of law." 512 F.2d at 544. It concluded that whether concealment of
overbooking could be characterized as tortious conduct was a matter to be determined,
in the first instance, by the CAB. 512 F.2d at 544.
The Supreme Court reversed on the question of primary jurisdiction and remanded
the case for consideration of the merits of the tort action. 44 U.S.L.W. at 480809. It held that "[n]o power to immunize [carriers against common-law liability]
can be derived from the language of § 411," 44 U.S.L.W. at 4806, and that "a
violation of § 411 ..• is not coextensive with a breach of duty under the common
law." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4807. Thus, the Court affirmed its earlier construction of
section 411 in American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79,
85 (1956) that CAB actions under this section are designed to protect the public
interest rather than to punish wrongdoing or protect injured competitors. Since
section 411 is "both broader and narrower than the remedies available at common
law," 44 U.S.L.W. at 4807, a Board decision under that section would not be
dispositive of common-law remedies. Moreover, since "[t]he standards to be applied
in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the conventional competence
of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be
helpful," the principle of primary jurisdiction was inappropriate. 44 U.S.L.W. at
4808. For a general discussion of primary jurisdiction, see K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 19.08 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE
AcnoN 122-40 (1965).
19. See Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS§ 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
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each case of "bumping" might vary the result, a scrutiny of Nader
shows that airline concealment of overbooking practices can satisfy
these elements of misrepresentation.
A false representation may consist of a false or ambiguous statement, a statement that is literally true but that creates a false impression in the mind of the hearer, active concealment of the truth,
nondisclosure where there exists a duty to disclose, a half-truth, or
nondisclosure of subsequently gained information that renders false a
statement that was true when made. 20 Airline dealings with their
customers concerning overbooking amount to false representations
under several of these alternatives.
An actual false statement may be involved since airlines confirm
reservations knowing that their customers might be denied boarding
because of overbooking. In Nader, Allegheny argued that it never
represented to the public that a confirmed reservation constituted an
absolute guarantee to a seat on a particular flight. 21 While he
acknowledged that the possibility of weather and mechanical difficulties precludes airlines from making such a guarantee, Nader contended
that Allegheny's confirmation in effect promised him that factors
over which the carrier did have control, such as reservation practices,
would not cause a boarding denial. 22 This contention seems reasonable23 and could well persuade courts to identify the confirmation of a
reservation without disclosure of overbooking as a false representation.
Such a reservation confirmation practice might also satisfy the
false representation requirement as an example of "active concealment." Evidence of mere nondisclosure of overbooking by an airline
will not suffice to show active concealment; there must be some
showing that the airline deliberately attempted to minimize the possibility that prospective customers would learn of the overbooking
practice. In the Nader litigation, Allegheny's affirmative policy of
instructing its employees to avoid mentioning the practice24 provided
substantial evidence of just such active concealment.
Mere nondisclosure satisfies the requirement of a false representation if the defendant owes a duty to disclose to the plaintiff. The
federal district court in Nader concluded that airlines were under a
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 694-96.
21. See Brief for Appellant, appendix, at 20, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
22. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 26 n.11.
23. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 44, 118-19.
24. See id. at 95-96 (testimony of J. McDonald, passenger service representative,
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.), id. at 128 (testimony of L.O. Barnes, President, Allegheny
Airlines, Inc.); Allegheny Passenger Service Manual (August 15, 1970), at 4,
reprinted in id. at 216-23.
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duty to inform their potential passengers of overbooking practices, 25
but the circuit court in effect vacated this decision by requiring that,
in the first instance, the CAB must decide whether airline disclosure
practices are fraudulent or deceptive. 26 Since the CAB has not yet
decided whether airlines owe a duty to their customers to explain
overbooking and its implications, 27 the circumstances of the airlinepassenger relationship must be examined to determine whether such a
duty can be inferred.
Even before the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act in
1938,28 airlines, as common carriers, had special duties of disclosure
to the public. This special status was recently reaffirmed in Fleming
v. Delta Airlines,29 in which the court held that airlines owe their
passengers "the duty to share with them information indicating . . .
serious weather disturbances, so they can choose for themselves
whether they are physically and emotionally capable of undertaking
the trip and wish to do so."30 Although it has been argued that this
particular duty only arises in the unique case in which nondisclosure
keeps an individual ignorant of possible physical peril,31 it can also be
viewed as part of a generally greater duty to disclose that arises from
the airline-passenger relationship. Granted, the relationship is not a
fiduciary or confidential one32 for which courts demand "a standard
of conduct above that of the ordinary marketplace where one is
naturally more on his guard and less trusting of the other." 33 Yet the
airline-passenger relationship is certainly not an ordinary, armslength, marketplace transaction; the public is encouraged to place its
confidence in the heavily regulated airline industry and in the CAB,
which was established for the protection of the public interest.34
Further, aside from the special duty of an airline that derives from its
status as a regulated carrier, the duty to disclose might arise independently from the airline's status as a vendor. 35 It is at least arguable
25. 365 F. Supp. at 132 ("a public duty and an especially large and high fiduciary
obligation to make its policies known to all of its customers with regard to its
intentional overbooking").
26. 512 F.2d at 544.
27. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8.
28. See generally 14 AM. JUR. Carriers§ 876, at 317 (1964).
29. 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
30. 359 F. Supp. at 341.
31. See Obde v. Schemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449,353 P.2d 672 (1960).
32. See Note, ls the Duty to Disclose a Question of Fair Conduct, 2 IDAHO L.
R.Ev. 112, 116 & n.22 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 697.
33. Note, supra note 4, at 116.
34. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 102, 1002(3), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302,
1482(e) (1970).
35. See American Natl. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S.
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affd.,
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that the vendor-airline possesses knowledge of a material fact ( overbooking) 36 and knows that its customers both act on the supposition
that overbooking does not take place and do not have the opportunity
to discover the truth about the practice. 37 It is worthwhile to note that
in Nader, Allegheny's president actually conceded that passengers are
entitled to notice of overbooking and its attendant risk. 38
A final way in which airline dealings with customers can be
identified as a false representation arises under an exception to the
general rule that nondisclosure does not constitute fraud absent a duty
to disclose. If after making a true statement a person acquires new
information that makes the statement false or misleading, he must
disclose that information to anyone who he knows is still acting on the
basis of the original statement. 30 Thus, an individual who makes a
confirmed reservation is generally assured of a seat on the plane
(assuming that the flight is not already overbooked). If the flight is
subsequently overbooked, the airline knows that individuals with
reservations are no longer assured of seats since they all are exposed
to the risk of being bumped. Arguably, airlines are then under a
duty to inform their passengers of this new development so that the
assurance implicit in the reservation confirmation will not be false or
misleading.
Once the existence of a false representation has been established
under one of the available theories, the plaintiff must then show that
the remaining four elements of the tort of fraudulent misrepr.esentation are present. 40 As a general rule, a false representation is material
if the fact falsely asserted or wrongfully suppressed would have
influenced the plaintiff's judgment or decision had he known it. 41
With the exception of the false representation requirement, this materiality element will likely be the most difficult for bumped airline
customers to satisfy. Nader succeeded by maintaining that he would
have changed his plans had he known of the risk of being bumped,42
testimony that seems quite plausible since the time of his arrival in
Hartford was of the utmost importance. In other cases, a plaintiff
might attempt to satisfy the materiality requirement by asserting that,
509 F.2d 1043 (1975); Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955);
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 697•.
36. See text at notes 41-43 infra.
37. See testimony dted in. note 24 supra.
38. Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 129.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 106, at 696-97 & n.32. On what constitutes a
false or misleading statement, see Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D.
Mich. 1961); Smith v. Pope, 103 N.H. 555, 176 A.2d 321 (1961).
40. See text at note 19 supra.
41. See Lowe v. United States, 389 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
912 (1968); Homelite v. Trywilk Realty Co., 272 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1959).
42. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 25.
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had he known of the overbooking and possibility of bumping, he
would have reserved space on more than one flight. Airlines might
respond that the prospect of being bumped could be found material
only if the plaintiff had also viewed the prospect of weather or
mechanical difficulties as material and had made contingency plans
for those possibilities. This argument had little chance of success in
the Nader case. Allegheny had a policy, known to Nader, of informing its customers of mechanical difficulties in advance, and the Washington-Hartford route was a well-traveled one for which Allegheny
had back-up planes. 43 Moreover, Nader knew in advance of the
flight that weather on the East Coast would likely pose no problems.
Other plaintiffs, however, may have more difficulty countering this
argument, particularly if their route is so infrequently traveled that
back-up planes are unlikely, or if they were booked on a connecting
or a long-distance flight and they made no advance check of the
weather forecasts.
Most bumped passengers should, like Nader, find it an easy
matter to demonstrate the third element of misrepresentation, the
airline's knowledge of the falsity of its representation. Airline
officials are aware of overbooking practices and, as the Eastern and
American manuals demonstrate, 44 also know that overbooking practices are being actively concealed. Indeed, it is unlikely that this
issue will be contested.
Similarly, bumped passengers should easily be able to demonstrate that airlines intend to induce reliance upon the false statement
or misleading omission. There is little question that airlines conceal
overbooking to induce customers both to make reservations and to
rely on the fact that they have reservations. In Nader, for example,
Allegheny Airlines admitted that it hoped passengers would expect
guaranteed seats when they were granted confirmed reservations. 45
Airline customers should have difficulty satisfying the final requirement, reliance upon the representation, only if they were aware
of the airline's practice of overbooking before the bumping occurred.
Reliance in the absence of such knowledge is not only reasonable but
is expected by the airlines. 46 The facts of Nader regarding the
reliance issue were somewhat unusual. Nader had been bumped
twice by other airlines (Eastern and American) during the six-month
period preceding the Allegheny bumping and had received the printed
statements concerning denied-boarding compensation required by
the CAB regulations. 47 These prior incidents, Allegheny contended,
43.
44.
45.
46.
41.

See id. at 32.
See text at notes 15-16 supra.
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, appendix, at 119.
See, e.g., id.
See text at note 14 supra.
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made Nader aware of the possibility of being bumped and thus
precluded any reliance by Nader on his Allegheny reservation. 48
Nader had three arguments with which to counter this contention,
arguments that should suffice for many other plaintiffs as well. First,
since denied boarding may have causes other than overbooking, 40
such as requisition of space by the government or reservation errors,
being bumped once does not give an individual notice of overbooking
practices. Second, the airlines refer to overbooking neither in their
printed statements nor in their on-the-ground explanations to passengers of the reasons for denied boarding. Finally, it cannot be presumed that an individual who knows that he has been bumped by one
airline because of intentional overbooking practices also knows that
other airlines engage in similar consumer abuses. 50 As the Supreme
Court has stated: "[T]here is no duty resting upon a citizen to
suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business."51 If
overbooking is a dishonest consumer abuse, therefore, individuals in
Nader's position should not be expected to impute dishonest overbooking practices to airlines other than those with which they have
dealt in the past.
Thus, it appears likely that concealment of overbooking practices
amounts to fraudulent misrepresentation under the tort law of many
states. The remainder of the Note focuses on whether federal law
and federal agency regulations can and actually do preempt state law
in this area. Section II will determine general principles of preemption, in both the airline and a broader context, while section Ill will
apply those principles to the overbooking practice.

Il.

CAB POWER TO PREEMPT STATE LAW

Any inquiry into the preemption of state law by a federal agency
such as the CAB must begin with a general examination of the
powers delegated to the agency by Congress, since the parameters of
an agency's preemptive capability are set by its enabling statute. G2 As
a general rule, delegated powers are broadly construed and "are not
limited to those expressly granted by the statutes, but include, also, all
48. Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 20-21 ("Mr. Nader had no reasonable
basis for believing that Allegheny's reservations practices with respect to overbooking
would be any different than those of its two competitors with which he had so
recently experienced being an oversale").
49. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 30.
50. See Federal Trade Comm. v. Standard Educ. Soc,, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
51. 302 U.S. at 116.
52. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 & n.22 (1944); Morrow v. Clayton,
326 F.2d 36, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1963). See generally Note, The Preemptio11 Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectives 011 Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 623,
639-49 (1975).
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of the powers that may fairly be implied therefrom." 53 Thus, the
Supreme Court has asserted that "the width of administrative authority
must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred, "54 and has indicated that regulatory acts are to be given
constructions that will enable the agencies to perform the duties
required of them by Congress. 55
The CAB has been charged with the responsibility of promoting a
number of public interest goals, 56 including "the encouragement and
development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the
present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States," 57 and "the promotion of adequate, economical, and
efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges." 58 The regulatory and rule-making authority that the agency has received59 to
achieve these goals extends to such areas as the issuance of certificates
·of public convenience and necessity, the granting of permits to foreign
air carriers, the approval of rates for the carriage of persons and property, the approval of consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control of air carriers, inquiries into the management of air carriers,
methods of competition, and loans and financial aid. An additional
source of CAB power is section 411 of the FAA, which allows the
Board to investigate possible unfair or deceptive practices in the airline
industry and, if it finds such practices, to issue cease and desist orders. 00 The remedies in section 411 are intended to supplement those
contained in other applicable federal and state laws. 61
53. Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36, 44 (10th Cir. 1963).
54. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968).
55. See Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 213
(1912). See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sumner Financial Corp., 451 F.2d
898 (5th Cir. 1971).
56. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
57. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1970).
58. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970).
59. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 401 to 417, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371 to 1387
(1970). The CAB also has the power to investigate and report on aircraft accidents.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 701, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
60. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). See note 18
supra.
61. See note 18 supra.
Such an interpretation of section 411 is consistent with the language of section
1106 of the FAA, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970): "Nothing contained in this chapter shall
in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." It must be noted,
however, that section 1106 should not be read literally to preclude the CAB from
preempting state remedies in any areas. In Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the Supreme Court refused to accept such an
interpretation for an identical clause in the Interstate Commerce• Act: "This clause
• . . cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common law right, the
continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of
the act. • . . [T]he act cannot be held to destroy itself." 204 U.S. at 466. A more
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It is clear in light of these broadly enumerated powers that the
CAB has the capability to preempt virtually all state laws affecting
the economic affairs of airlines and the airline-passenger relationship,
so long as its action is consistent with the "public interest" of providing the public adequate transportation and allowing the airlines sufficient revenue, and is not violative of specific FAA limitations or any
other federal law. This conclusion only begins the inquiry, however,
for the more difficult determination is whether or not the CAB has, in
fact, preempted a particular state law. The remainder of this section
examines three considerations that bear on this determination: first,
what general standards the Supreme Court has employed to determine whether federal actions preempt state law in the absence of an
express intent of Congress or the CAB to preempt; second, how these
standards have been applied in the area of airline regulation to
delineate federal and state spheres; and, finally, what procedural
mechanisms the CAB can employ to evidence specific intent to
override state law.
In the absence of an express congressional or administrative
agency intention to preempt state law, the courts have developed
various approaches designed to determine the compatibility of state
law with federal regulatory schemes. Basically, they have looked to
the degree of conflict, actual and potential, between the federal and
state laws and to "the peculiarities and special features of the federal
regulatory scheme in question." 62
logical reading, and one that comports with the Court's preemption decisions, is that
the provision disclaims any congressional intent to occupy the whole field of airline
regulation, but does not reduce either the supremacy of federal law or the power of
the CAB specifically to preempt state law in the course of regulating the airline
industry.
Another important provision of the FAA is section 414, which grants the CAB
the power to exempt the airline industry in certain contexts from application of the
federal antitrust laws. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384
(1970). This is a necessary adjunct to the CAB's power to approve agreements
among air carriers and common carriers that affect air transportation. See Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970); Breen Air Freight, Ltd, v. Air
Cargo Inc., 470 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
Finally, section 404(b) of the FAA forbids air carriers from establishing discriminatory ratemaking and boarding policies. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49
U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). The provision also limits the CAB and is perhaps the
most significant express constraint on the CAB's powers contained in the FAA. See
Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 14. Section 404 has been construed to
create a private cause of action in favor of individuals who are victimized by
unreasonable preferences or unjust discrimination as defined in the provision. See
Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972). See
also Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
62. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
Supreme Court decisions dealing with preemption are difficult to organize in a
conceptually sound manner, for the facts of each case loom large and the intent of
Congress rarely is so clear as to excuse the courts from weighing policy considerations. Generalizations, accordingly, are difficult to make, and the lessons of one area
of substantive law are not easily transferred to other areas.
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For many years after the Supreme Court's decision in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 63 the judiciary found a strong presumption in favor of
federal, rather than state, interests and was willing to find preemption
when the nature of the federal regulation seemed to call for it, 64
despite the absence of clear congressional intent to occupy the field or
of any actual conflict. The Court found preemption during this
period whenever the congressional regulatory design allowed for such
an inference65 or whenever the state law was in potential conflict
with the federal legislation. 66 In Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, lnc., 67 the Court held that
provisions of the Federal Communications Act68 prohibiting censorship of political broadcasters immunized broadcasters from state libel
laws, despite the absence of evidence of legislative intent to occupy
the field and the absence of serious conflict. According to the Court,
factors extrinsic to the Act and considerations of fairness to broadcasters required invalidation of state law as applied to individuals
embraced by the Act. 69
Since 1973, the Court has altered its standards for inferring
congressional intent to occupy a field and has required that preemption be based on a more definite showing of inconsistency between
federal and state provisions. In New York State Department of
Social Services v. Dublino, 70 the Court made a significant break with
the solicitude for federal law manifested in Hines and its progeny: "It
will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede
the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed." 71 In dictum, the Dublino Court also rephrased the test for determining whether an apparent state-federal
conflict will effect a preemption: "Conflicts, to merit judicial rather
than cooperative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and
63. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
64. See Note, supra note 52, at 630-39.
65. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).
66. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
67. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
69. 360 U.S. at 531-35. Solicitude to a federal regulatory scheme was also shown
in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees
of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), involving a suit brought by a former
labor union member seeking damages for his allegedly wrongful suspension from the
union and for his resulting loss of employment. From the structure of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970), and the active role played by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in developing a substantive law governing
labor relations, the Court concluded that state jurisdiction over the unfair practice
claim had been preempted. 403 U.S. at 290.
70. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
71. 413 U.S. at 413, quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
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not merely trivial or insubstantial." 72 In a similar departure from its
previous approach, the Court in Goldstein v. California73 (involving
an alleged inconsistency between a California copyright statute and
the copyright clause of the Constitution) announced that, in the
absence of any actual conflict, federal law occupied a field and
preempted state law only when the matter was "necessarily national in
import" and such that conflicts would be inevitable, not merely
possible. 74
In the CAB context, then, the preemption standards of Goldstein
and Dublino require a three-fold inquiry. The first determination is
whether there exists a conflict of some substance between the state
law at issue and some valid federal regulation. The second is whether
the area regulated is of such- national import and conflicts are so
inevitable that the state law cannot be allowed to stand even though
no present conflict exists. Neither of these determinations, of course,
places significant reliance on express congressional or CAB intent.
The third determination is whether the CAB has preempted the state
law by manifesting a clear intent to do so. Of course, the CAB can
preempt state law in this third manner only if its approval of the
airline activity being regulated or prohibited by the state is consistent
with the public interest.
Although the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine has changed
recently, its prior decisions in the field of airline regulation remain
indicative of the Court's view concerning the proper spheres of federal
and state law. The cases indicate that, under either the Hines or
Dublino standards, federal law overrides all state laws or regulations
that affect the timing, scheduling, or patterns of flights. Moreover,
federal law governs the contractual obligations of the airlines and the
quality of the services that airlines must provide, subject to the
condition that contractual terms approved by the CAB are in the
public interest. Finally, the cases show that state law controls both
the imposition of property taxes on the airlines and tort liability of
airlines, except where overridden by a particular federal enactment or
by a CAB regulation that furthers some substantial public interests.
The preemptive impact of the FAA in the sphere of regulating the
scheduling and operations of flights was demonstrated in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, lnc.,7 5 in which the Court invalidated a municipal noise-control ordinance forbidding jet aircraft from
taldng off from a local airport during certain nighttime hours. The
Court's decision drew upon ambiguous evidence that the FAA was
intended to preempt state and local noise abatement measures, but
72.
73.
74.
75.

413 U.S.
412 U.S.
412 U.S.
411 U.S.

at 423 n.29.
546 (1973).
at 554 (emphasis original).
624 (1973 ).
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rested principally upon "the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal
regulation of aircraft noise." 76 The Federal Aviation Act, as amended
by the Noise Control Act of 1972,77 vests .the CAB with the power
to promulgate noise regulations and controls, the power to modify,
suspend, or revoke aircraft operators' certificates for violations of the
provisions, and the power to regulate takeoff and landing procedures,
which includes authority to impose local curfews. 78 The Court intimated that the exercise of these powers requires a delicate balancing
of the interests of those on ground and the need for safe and efficient
airline service, a balancing that local governments cannot conduct
properly. 79 The effect of the local ordinance was to regulate the
scheduling of air flights and to increase unsafe flight congestion in the
hours immediately preceding the beginning of the daily curfew. This
effect, the Court asserted, was inconsistent with the objectives of the
federal statutory and regulatory scheme. 80
The importance of Burbank extends beyond its limited holding
concerning local noise ordinances if it is read alongside section 1108
of the FAA, which makes clear that the navigable airways are part of
the federal domain and subject to exclusive federal authority. 81 The
Court's emphasis on the effect of the Burbank ordinance on flights
traveling in that airspace suggests that the exclusive federal power
over the airways extends to ground activities that necessarily affect the
scheduling and operation of flights. Although the Burbank decision
deviates in language from the standards set forth in Goldstein and
Dublino, its finding of preemption seems reasonably consistent with
the results in those cases, since local ordinances of the type at issue
will inevitably interfere with CAB flight scheduling efforts.
Lower court decisions suggest that the terms of the airline-passenger contract are also determined entirely by federal law. In Lichten
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 82 for example, a federal district court invalidated contract provisions that limited Eastem's liability for negligently
lost or damaged baggage, despite implicit approval of the carrier's
tariff by the CAB. The court of appeals reversed the district court
and upheld the liability limitation on the ground that the CAB's aim
of ensuring fair and uniform airline rates and services could be
achieved only if the federal regulatory scheme, rather than state
common law, governed the airline-passenger contract. 83 Similarly,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

411 U.S. at 633.
Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234, amending 49 U.S.C.
49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(l) (1970).
411 U.S. at 638-39.
411 U.S. at 627.
49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970).
189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
189 F.2d at 941.

§

1431 (1970).
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in Mack v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 84 plaintiff passenger sought damages in tort and contract for the defendant airline's failure, caused
by adverse weather conditions to transport him the full distance of
his flight. The court dismissed the action on the ground that the
state law remedies were preempted by the defendant's tariff, filed
with the CAB, which limited the airline's liability in such instances.au
The decisions involving the airline-passenger contract are not
difficult to reconcile with the Goldstein-Dublino preemption standards. Air tariff regulation lies at the heart of the CAB's functions,
and it is likely that inconsistencies and conflicts would arise if the
states were free to regulate the airline-passenger contract. Contract
provisions override state laws, of course, only when approved by the
CAB and when the approval is consistent with the public interest.
It should not be thought, however, that Congress intended to
preempt state law applicable to the airline industry simply by enacting
the FAA and establishing the CAB,86 or that the courts have always
found preemption to shield the airlines from state law. In two areas,
personal property taxation and liability for violation of noncontractual duties, state law has governed.
The state power to impose personal property taxes on airline
equipment was considered in a series of Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 81 for example, the Court upheld a
state tax imposed on an airline's planes that were based in the state
and were within the state at least some time during the tax year, while
in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and
Assessment,88 the Court upheld a state's power to tax all planes that
had sufficient nexus with the state to satisfy due process requirements. 89 These decisions are consistent with Goldstein and Dublino,
since state taxes have an economic impact on airlines but do not in any
way impinge on the timing, frequency or procedures of airline flights,
on the CAB's power over the structure and operation of airline
companies, or on the terms of the airline-passenger and airlineemployee relationships. At some point, an economic burden will
84. 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1949).
85. 87 F. Supp. at 115-16.
86. See note 61 supra.
87. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
88. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
89. The prohibition against unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce has led
the Court to invalidate state tax schemes where double taxation is likely. Compare
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973) (state can tax aircraft fuel
stored in the state prior to use), with Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929) (state
cannot tax gasoline loaded on ferrY in another state and consumed during trip through
the taxing state).
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frustrate the CAB's power to control air fares, but that burden must
be of some substance to trigger preemption. 90
State law also generally governs the liability of airlines both to
passengers for violations of duties not stipulated directly in the airline-passenger contract and to individuals on the ground. Thus in
Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 91 the Mississippi
supreme court concluded that owners of property contiguous to airports could recover under state law, notwithstanding the federal
regulatory scheme, for property damage.caused by low-flying aircraft.
Similarly, it is well established that property owners can recover under
state law for property damage caused by aircraft accidents,92 that
airline passengers may bring suit under state law for injuries received
during a flight, 93 prior to flight while on board the aircraft, 94 and
while in the airport terminal, 95 and, finally, that the federal regulatory
scheme does not preclude state wrongful death actions. 96
In the tort area, the general tests of inconsistency and conflict
between the Federal Aviation Act and state law will most often fail to
justify a finding of preemption, particularly under the new standards
that require more than a mere inference of conflict. In Burbank, the
Court found preemption where the FAA specifically provided for
noise regulations and where acquiescence to the state scheme would
90. The CAB's aims in controlling airfares are the regulation of airline competition and the promotion of efficient air transportation. See text at notes 56-58 supra.
State regulations with some economic impact do not frustrate the first aim so long as
they are applied to all airlines equally. In promoting efficient air service, the CAB
must consider the validity of airline expenditures to ensure that airlines are not
accorded a fair rate of return when they are in fact being managed inefficiently.
State-imposed economic burdens that serve no valid state interests would frustrate
the goal of efficient air transportation and could legitimately be overridden by the
CAB. When such burdens do serve valid interests and are not so large or varying
in amount that the CAB cannot establish reasonable air fares, they should be upheld
even though they trigger some air fare increases. This conclusion is supported by
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707
(1972), in which the Court upheld the power of states and municipalities to impose a
one dollar airport-user charge on enplaning passengers. Because the user charge was
in addition to the air fare established by the CAB, it was held not to interfere with the
CAB function of establishing efficient tariffs. Moreover, the charge was challenged
only on the basis of an alleged repugnancy to the commerce clause, the equal
protection clause, and the constitutional right to travel, and not on the ground of any
CAB or FAA preemption. Yet the charge did increase the cost of air travel, and it
would seem of little importance that the charge was in addition to the air fare rather
than incorporated within it.
91. 191 S.2d 126 (1966).
92. D. BII.LYOU, AIR LAW 87-90 (1964).
93. See generally Note, The Liability of Airlines for Injuries to Passengers, 31 S.
CAL. L. REV. 319 (1958).
94. See sources cited in D. Bn.LYOU, supra note 92, at 99 n.6.
95. See, e.g., Garrett v. American Airlines, Inc., 332 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964).
96. See, e.g., Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. A.H. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 645-48,
355 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1962).
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have seriously interfered with the CAB's control over the timing,
scheduling and patterns of flights. In Lichten and Mack, the courts
invalidated state laws that attempted to override express contractual
relations between the airlines and passengers, despite approval of the
tariffs by the CAB. Air tariff regulation can reasonably be seen as
lying at the heart of CAB functions. Airline immunity from all
forms of tort liability, however, cannot easily be inferred from the
purposes and provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. Vulnerability of
the lines to liability under state law does not normally interfere with
the CAB's regulatory functions in the crucial areas of flight operations and passenger-airline relations, although such liability can have
an economic impact on the lines, as does imposition of the property
tax.
To find preemption of state tort law, something more than an
inference derived from reviewing the provisions of the FAA and the
tort law is needed; there must be an affirmative showing that, pursuant to its various powers, the CAB has approved explicitly a
particular liability-creating airline practice or has required the airlines
to engage in that particular activity. 97 Any such action is clearly
subject to challenge as inconsistent with the public interest, 08 but, if
valid, the sanction can effectively insulate the practice from state tort
law liability.
The CAB can approve airline practices either by accepting the
terms of the airline-passenger contract found in the tariff or by
promulgating rules and specifically approving managerial and organizational changes in the course of economic regulation. It is important to note, however, that even CAB requirements or approvals are
often limited in the protection that they afford the airlines and thus
should not be constructed to preempt all state regulation of the
subject.
The fact that the CAB requires an airline to engage in an activity
often does not protect the airline from liability for the activity. The
operation of this principle is well illustrated outside the CAB context
by the Supreme Court's decision in Regents v. Carrol. 00 The Federal
Communications Commission had conditioned the issuance of a license on the applicant's dissaffirmance of a contract with a third
party. The applicant did so unilaterally and was sued for breach of
contract. On review, the Supreme Court concluded that, while the
FCC was powerless to pass upon the validity of private contracts, the
97. Section 1106 of the FAA seems to rebut the inference that Congress intended
to preempt state law applicable to the airline industry simply by enacting the FAA
and establishing the CAB. See note 61 supra.
98. In Jackson Municipal Airport, for example, the CAB lacked the power to
authorize a taking of property without compensation. 191 S.2d at 126.
99. 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
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agency could impose such conditions on the issuance of licenses.
However, the fact that the disaffirmance was required by the FCC,
the Court emphasized, did not absolve the license applicant from
breach of contract liability, for it was a fundamental rule of constitutional law that "the imposition of the conditions cannot directly affect
the applicant's responsibilities (under state law) to a third party
dealing with the applicant."100 In the CAB context, the Regents
principle was demonstrated in Jackson Municipal Airport, in which
the airline flight path that amounted to the "taking" of an easement
over plaintiff's property had been prescribed by the CAB. The
defendants, nonetheless, were forced to compensate for the "taking."
Similarly, CAB rulings that permit an airline to commit a particular act do not absolve the airline from liability for the manner in
which the act is committed. In Hughes v. Trans World Airlines,
lnc., 101 for example, the CAB had approved a corporate acquisition
on the ground that it was essential to the public interest. The
approval immunized the parent corporation from antitrust liability
but did not shield the corporate officers and the corporation's majority
shareholder from liability for breach of their fiduciary duties to the
subsidiary and its minority shareholders. 102
Another limitation on the preemptive impact of CAB approvals
of airline practices arises when the Board, under section 411 of the
FAA,103 investigates an allegedly fraudulent and deceptive airline
practice and finds that there is no need to issue a cease and desist
order. Arguably, such a finding is tantamount to an approval and
insulates the activity from state-law liability. Yet this conclusion is
not consistent with the explicit language of section 1106104 and the
reluctance of the Supreme Court in recent years to find preemption.
The purpose of section 411 was not to replace state-law remedies but
rather to provide the CAB with an additional procedure for regulating the airlines and protecting the public.100 Since there is no
necessary overlapping of CAB and state-law definitions of fraud and
unfair practice, a decision not to enjoin a particular practice is
dispositive only for the federal remedy, and is not necessarily an
affirmative agency indication that the practice is in the public's best
interest and merits immunity from state-law interferenc~. Thus, the
CAB may decide that a practice in general is not deceptive or
100. 338 U.S. at 600.
101. 336 A.2d 572 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975).
102. See also McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.
1965); Otis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), affd. mem.,
155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
103. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). See note 18 supra.
104. See note 61 supra.
105. See generally, American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351
U.S. 79, 85 (1956).
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fraudulent and yet still recognize that it may cause injury to individuals. For example, although the CAB has implicitly determined that
overbooking is not fraudulent or deceptive under section 411, it has
also recognized that individuals may be injured by overbooking and
has thus offered bumped passengers either denied boarding compensation as liquidated damages or the right to sue for their state-law
remedies. 106 In short, the refusal of the CAB to issue a cease and
desist order under 411 does not necessarily constitute the "clear
manifestation of intention" required to find preemption in the absence of some actual conflict.

ill.

CAB

PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW MISREPRESENTATION

This section will determine whether state remedies for concealment of overbooking have been preempted by the FAA or by some
CAB action. It seems clear that under the Goldstein-Dublino "conflict" standards of what constitutes preemption, 107 the tort remedy of
misrepresentation is not fundamentally inconsistent with the Federal
Aviation Act. Lack of airline immunity will not undermine the
purposes of the Act or interfere with the CAB's supervision of flights
and the airline-passenger relationship. Misrepresentation should be
treated like other torts that are not automatically invalidated for
inconsistency with the F AA. 108 The focus of this section is therefore
on whether the CAB has manifested a specific intent to preempt state
remedies and on whether such preemptive intent is actually within the
power of the CAB.
In recognition of the seriousness of the no-show problem for
airlines, the CAB has reluctantly approved the practice of overbooking.100 In 1962, the CAB accepted the airlines' proposed deniedboarding compensation tariff for bumped passengers but included a
caveat that it did not condone deliberate oversales by air carriers. The
Board also stated that the denied boarding compensation was only an
alternative to the passengers' right to damages under the common
law.110 In 1964, the Board affirmed the policy111 but stated that
106. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 13-14; note 18 supra.
107. See text at notes 70-74 supra.
108. See text at notes 91-98 supra.
109. See Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8.
110. CAB Order No. E-18064, 35 CAB 881, 882 (March 1, 1962): ''The Board's
action in making provision for payment to oversold passengers should not be
construed as an indication that the Board condones deliberate oversales on the part of
the air carriers. On the contrary, the proposed plan is designed to provide a measure
of relief for passengers who are the victims of inadvertancies. Instances of intentional
oversales will be fully investigated . . . . Moreover, to the extent that the
proposed tariff provision is designed to restrict a passenger from seeking damages to
which he would otherwise be entitled under the common law, we find it to be adverse
to the public interest."
111. CAB Order No. E-20859 (May 25, 1964).
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carriers "must continue to seek other solutions" to the no-show
problem.11 2 A decade later, the CAB resumed hearings on airline
reservation practices. While a final Board decision has not yet been
handed down, the administrative-law judge presiding over the hearings concluded that the current scheme of overbooking, denied boarding compensation, and survival of state remedies was not deceptive
within the meaning of section 411. 113
However, the CAB has never approved or condoned the airline
practice of concealing overbooking from the public. The Board
made this fact clear in an amicus brief filed in Nader in which it
stated that it has yet to determine whether "confirmed reservation
advertising coupled with nondisclosure of overbooking amounts to an
unfair or deceptive practice . . . ." 114 In 1967, it was proposed
that airlines be required to inform passengers of an overbooking at
least twelve hours before flight time. The CAB refused to require
this type of notification only because it feared that the benefits of such
notification would be outweighed by its administrative burdens and
extreme cost. 115 Refus~J to require notification cannot reasonably be
taken as evidence that the CAB approved of concealment.
Thus, the CAB has not manifested the type of specific intent to
preempt state laws required by the Goldstein and Dublino decisions.
The requirement of a specific approval of an industry practice was
reiterated in Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, lnc., 116 an action
involving an alleged antitrust violation. As noted above, 117 Congress
has vested the CAB with the power to exempt the airline industry
from application of the antitrust laws. Yet in Breen Air, the circuit
- court held that the district court should exercise its jurisdiction because the agreements allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws had
never been specifically approved by the Board. 118
112. Id. at 3.
113. Order of Associate Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert L. Park, Emergency Reservations Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No. 26253 (June 10, 1974),
included ill CAB Initial Decision, supra note 3.
114. Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 34.
115. Proposed Priority Rules, supra note 8, at 460: "We (the CAB) propose to
deal with the oversales problem by other means for the following reasons: (1) The
proposed notice requirement would have necessitated substantial changes in the
reservation practices and system of carriers, . . . a system which has, on the balance,
worked reasonably well in the public interest . . . (3) finally, the Board believes the
oversales problem can be substantially reduced by the proposals herein to require
carriers (a) to make prompt, effective and adequate compensation to oversold
passengers, (b) to establish priority rules for determining which passengers holding
confirmed reserved space shall be denied boarding on oversold flights, and (c) to file
reports of unaccommodated passengers."
116. 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972).
111. See note 61 supra.
118. As a jurisdictional matter, the court also concluded that the agreements at
issue were not lawful or arguably lawful, and thus not within the primary jurisdiction
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Furthermore, the fact that the CAB has implicitly approved
airline overbooking in no way obviates the need for some showing of
agency intent to insulate airlines from misrepresentation liability for
concealment. Instructive analogy can be drawn to the instances
in which agencies have issued permissive orders that allow regulated
enterprises to commit a particular act or engage in a specific activity, 119 but do not immunize those enterprises from liability for the
manner in which they commit the act. These decisions suggest that
CAB approval of overbooking, without more, would not shield airlines from liability for the manner in which they engage in overbooking.
Finally, it should be stressed that even an unambiguous expression of specific intent by the CAB to preempt state tort law would be
meaningless if the Board actually lacks the capacity to approve intentional torts such as deliberate misrepresentation. As noted above, 120
the Board has broad powers to regulate virtually all aspects of airlinepassenger relations. The inability of the CAB to approve tortious
conduct would derive from the requirement that its actions be in the
public interest. Yet, the CAB determines in the first instance what
actions are consistent with the public interest, and its orders are
upheld on review by the courts of appeals so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. 121
Still, it is doubtful that the benefits to the public from concealment outweigh the harm caused by the practice. On the one hand,
if the practice of overbooking were publicized, the no-show problem
might be aggravated by potential customers who would ensure themselves against being bumped by making more reservations than they
could use. On the other hand, overbooking can cause passengers
considerable inconvenience and harm, as the Nader case demonstrates. And the possible availability of alternative reservation
schemes122 to resolve the no-show problem makes resort to tortious
conduct even more questionable. For example, a number of airlines
have attempted to deal with no-shows and late cancellations by
instituting a conditional reservation tariff123 on an experimental basis,
of the CAB. 470 F.2d at 773-74. For a good discussion of the arguably lawful test,
see King, The Arguably Lawful Test of Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litigation
Involving Regulated Industries, 40 TENN. L. R.Ev. 617 ( 1973).
119. See text at notes 101-102 supra.
120. See text at notes 56-61 supra.
121. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1486(a),(e) (1970).
122. See text at notes 5-6 supra.
123. Eastern Airlines has established a procedure whereby any passenger may
obtain "leisure class" or conditional reservations as well as confirmed first class and
coach reservations. The passenger with a conditional reservation for which regular
coach fair has been paid is entitled to a preferred stand-by coach seat for his flight; if
no such coach seat is available, he is given a first class seat; if no seats on his flight
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although there is no evidence yet as to its effectiveness. It is unlikely
that the shortcomings of these alternative approaches to the no-show
problem are sufficiently great to justify the injury caused to individuals, and hence to the public interest, by airlines' intentional misrepresentation.124
are available the passenger may have a refund as well as a free seat on the next
available flight
124. In his concurring opinion in Nader, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4808, Justice White
stated: "It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would have the
authority to order airline overbooking and to preempt recoveries under state law for
undisclosed overbooking or for overselling." This Note disagrees with that conclusion.

